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ABSTRACT
This article argues that the Algerian FLN (Front de libération
nationale) played a major role in shaping the character of post-
Second World War Europe.  A sub-state terrorist organization dedi-
cated to ending colonial domination of Algeria in the 1950s, the FLN
effectively dashed France’s dreams of resuming its position as a
global power, which in turn promoted greater commitment on the
part of France to the nascent European Community. The FLN may
also be said to have inadvertently contributed to the first large-scale
immigration of Muslims into Europe during the modern era, while
also severely complicating the relationship between France and its
Muslims for decades.  While the FLN’s use of political terror shaped
national liberation movements across the developing world, the pri-
mary focus of this article will instead be on the ways in which the
FLN’s victory in Algeria served to promote French participation in
the European experiment and how the exodus of France’s Arab and
Berber allies at the conclusion of the conflict added to the extant
piedmont of Muslim Europeans reshaping the ethnography of
Western Europe.  
INTRODUCTION
When faced with a committed terrorist movement in Algeria, which was
considered a part of metropolitan France rather than a colonial possession, both
French society and its political elite opted (with some dissent) to abandon the
institutionalized violence of imperialism, therefore avoiding the crushing social,
economic, and political effects of terrorism. Part of this process was achieved
through a psychic break with the pied-noirs community which, by the end of the
war, came to be seen by metropolitan French as a barbarous and violent “other,”
best consigned to the past. With the conclusion of the Algerian War of
Independence (1954-62), France committed itself to no longer being the victim
or the perpetrator of political violence. This decision was strongly supported by
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the intellectual elites of the day. Albert Camus’s criticism of terrorism and Jean-
Paul Sartre’s attack on imperialism both contributed to the contemporary analy-
sis of the situation in Algeria and shaped perceptions of the French state and its
place in history. In the words of then-President Charles de Gaulle, “France was
now free to marry her age” and benefit from the peace and prosperity of Europe.1
De Gaulle, though a realist, utilized the Algerian crisis to advance France’s
national interest by charting a new course for the republic — one in which mas-
tery of Europe rather than superpower status was the ultimate goal. Mass indus-
trialization, the Common Market, increased standards of living and attendant
consumerism, and European integration thus became the focus of post-Algeria
France, helping the French to quickly forget their violent colonial past. If the
Algerian debacle had not occurred when it did, there is a strong possibility that
France might never have truly “buried the hatchet” with Germany nor shifted its
spending from defense to social programs, and possibly even attempted to posi-
tion itself as a third pole in the global struggle for hegemony (a policy which lin-
gered after 1962 but was ultimately subsumed by France’s commitment to the
European experiment).
Terror attacks by FLN maquisards on pro-French elements within the
indigenous Muslim population during and after the war created an environment
where nearly all Muslims who did not support the independence movement were
seen as reasonable targets for political violence.  Muslim soldiers serving French
interests, known as harkis, increasingly feared for their safety as the war pro-
gressed — and with good reason. According to Alistair Horne, “An estimated
one (out of ten) million Muslim Algerians died [in the conflict], most killed by
their own people.”2 Throughout the war, the vast majority of  FLN terror was
directed at Muslims who pursued accommodationist paths with the French and
European colonists in order to increase societal polarization.3
Dreading reprisals, nearly 100,000 harkis left Algeria for France in 1962,
forming a close-knit diaspora community. Thanks to liberal immigration policies
which allowed for family reunification, this community was able to grow con-
siderably over time. Today, France’s population includes upwards of eight mil-
lion Muslims,4 with a sizeable percentage descending from the original harki
immigrants. France’s negligent policies toward the harkis and their children and
the resulting legacy of resentment and alienation is, in some part, to blame for
the increasing attractiveness of radical Islamism.
While we do not argue that the FLN victory is responsible for either the
formation, preservation, or ultimate success of the 25-nation European Union
(EU), it is our contention that without the socio-political nexus created by
France’s (political, though not military) defeat at the hands of Algerian terrorists,
the Fifth Republic’s participation in the EU might have played out much differ-
ently. The long-term effects of Paris’ decision to abandon its global imperial aims
and instead assume the leading role in building the European Community are
DooleySaunders  4/19/09  8:20 PM  Page 91
Winter 2007
92
profound and enduring. Furthermore, by permitting the large-scale immigration
of post-colonial subjects, France has contributed significantly to the Islamization
of Europe while simultaneously pursuing policies that have bred resentment
among the Muslim community.
The FLN, Algérie Française, and the Untenable Myths of Equality
Former President François Mitterand, as minister of the interior, once
famously stated, “Algeria is France.” However, the FLN’s violent rejection of
this notion led to a clean break with what had been an unhappy historical rela-
tionship or what Kristen Ross called a “long and abiding ‘mixed’ marriage”
between European and Islamic civilizations.5 While the official rhetoric of
France was that adoption of French culture and jus soli were the key pathways to
French citizenship, Algeria’s Muslims were institutionally denied access to the
benefits of the French state. As Christopher Harrison stated, “The concept of
Algérie française was an expression of unity that belied a great deal of tension.
Indigenous Muslims had been consistently denied basic political rights and dis-
posed of their best land by the ‘colons’.”6 France’s Muslims were generally
unable to gain French citizenship if they insisted on maintaining their hereditary
religion. France was not, in fact, seeking to proselytize Catholicism; rather there
was the distinct fear that the religiosity of Algeria’s Muslims would dilute
France’s dearly held tradition of secularism. Thus, the situation of the Berbers
and Arabs within the French state was an uncomfortable and embarrassing “fam-
ily secret”7 for the French whose notions of citizenship and national identity
were effectively undermined by a double-standard in Algeria. Furthermore,
Sartre’s writings on imperialism led to an increasingly sophisticated understand-
ing of the institutional violence of imperialism on the part of the French public.8
Taken together, these stark realities did not adequately represent the ideals of the
new France. 
France’s vicious response to riots on V-E Day in Sétif on 8 May 1945
served to underline the subaltern status of Muslim Algerians who had revolted in
an effort to gain the rights of French citizens. The bloody aftermath of the French
crackdown, which resulted in the deaths of thousands of Muslims, removed the
fig leaf of the “national unity” of Algeria with Continental France. Muslim
Algerians fought and died in large numbers during the First and Second World
Wars defending the patrie from autocracy and fascism yet were unable to bene-
fit from France’s victories or share in her prosperity. Instead, they seemed to be
permanently consigned to second-class status. A sea change occurred after Sétif,
which had sent a clear signal that the Muslims could expect none of the benefits
of French citizenship, despite the fact that they lived within the administrative
territories of the French Republic. Furthermore, French military and policing
policy in Algeria grew ever more draconian.
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The French implemented a policy of “collective responsibility.’’
When a French soldier was killed, the Algerian people were held
responsible, and a village was burned to the ground. An estimated
8,000 villages were so torched.9
In such a milieu, the Muslims of Algeria felt they had more in common
with the Vietnamese, Senegalese, and France’s other colonial subjects than with
the Bretons, Corsicans, Basques, or metropolitan France’s other peripheral — yet
constitutive — ethnic groups. The FLN and its political forebears (for example,
Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action) played on this changing sentiment
and used the memory of Sétif (and other crackdowns on political action), as well
as the worsening demographic and economic situation among the Muslim com-
munity, to attract a new cadre of Muslims committed to complete independence
from France.10
Despite the FLN’s nationalist rhetoric in support of all Algerian Muslims,
from its very beginning the organization was notable for its bloody campaign
against those very people it claimed to represent.11 The spectacular violence per-
petrated by the FLN on Arabs and Berbers in Algeria after 1954, while ironical-
ly garnering nearly ubiquitous loyalty amongst the Muslim population, led to a
widening gulf between the Muslims and French. The use of throat-slitting, dis-
emboweling, the cutting off of noses, and other appalling tactics rendered the
Muslim unredeemable in the minds of many Frenchmen, who were doing their
best to put the actual and institutional violence of the Second World War behind
them and create a moral and just society governed by international laws and
respect for the Rights of Man. It can also be argued that the symbolic violence
used by the FLN purposely played on eternal European prejudices against the
“marauding” Arab,12 further dividing the European and Muslim communities —
a primary goal of the FLN from its inception.  The lasting bitterness of France
toward the Philippeville Massacre of 20 August 1955 “in which FLN operatives
killed thirty-seven ordinary colons with sharp implements, inflicting mutilations
on their victims” resonated throughout the war serving for many as a powerful
totem of the civilizational divide between the Muslims and Europeans.13
This view of the metropolitan French was further heightened by the FLN’s
policies of “isolation terrorism” which, according to Hutchinson, was successful
in promoting a severing of all ties with both the government and European com-
munity in Algeria. “The non-cooperation campaign meant that Algerian children
were forbidden to attend French schools, the indigent were forbidden to accept
assistance or to work for a French employer, those in need of legal aid were for-
bidden to see a French attorney, the ill were forbidden to consult a French doc-
tor or pharmacist, and peasants were forbidden to accept French plots in the
French land-grant programs.”14 These policies, some of which were conducted
under the aegis of the aim of the re-Islamification of Algeria, served to bring
about an end to the moribund notion that “integration” was still possible.
According to William Watson,
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In January 1958 de Gaulle gradually became convinced that France’s
Algerian adventure of 130 years should come to an end. He came to
believe that it was not politically, economically, or culturally sound
to further integrate Algeria and its huge impoverished Muslim popu-
lation into its more prosperous Catholic European population . . . De
Gaulle believed that France would be stronger in the world without
Algeria than with it.15
When de Gaulle relinquished control of Algeria, many French gave a collective
sigh of relief as the national contradiction of non-citizen Muslims living within
French borders — but outside of French society — was finally resolved.16
While the Arabs and Berbers of the Maghreb have often been discussed as
a constitutive “other”17 for the French, in the context of the Algerian War, the
more immediate “other” was not the culturally and religiously alien Muslim but
instead the strange yet undeniably familiar colon.18 Beginning in 1830, a steady
trickle of Europeans had migrated to Algeria and other parts of the Maghreb as
permanent settlers. These immigrants came from France (especially Alsace after
the Franco-Prussian War) and various parts of the Mediterranean basin, particu-
larly from Valencia in southern Spain but also Sicily, Malta, and Corsica. The
Europeans settled in urban areas and the temperate, fertile coastal regions of
North Africa. There they intermingled with Jews, Berbers, and Arabs but
observed the tried-and-true Ottoman demographic tradition of residing in sepa-
rate quarters from the indigenous population. Over time, the Europeans came to
be known collectively as pieds-noirs (‘black feet’).19 By the Second World War,
there were roughly one million pieds-noirs living in Algeria, 240,000 in
Morocco, and 175,000 in Tunisia.20
The panoply of Europeans residing in North Africa (principally in the
coastal areas of Algeria) steadily developed a cogent identity based on the French
language (which most Jews came to adopt, eschewing Ladino), the perquisites
and demands of colonial domination, and their rugged character and individual-
ism. According to Paul Silverstein, the pieds-noirs saw themselves as a “new,
mixed Latin race, rejuvenated by the African sun.”21 Many metropolitan French
observers compared the energetic, intrepid, and entrepreneurial pieds-noirs to the
Americans who settled the Far West.22 While their religious, ethnic, and linguis-
tic attributes easily differentiated the pieds-noirs from their indigenous Arab and
Berber counterparts, their machismo, hybridity, organizational character, and his-
torical background made distinctions with metropolitan French almost as palpa-
ble.
Blood on the Tricolor: Muslim and “White” Terrorism Hit Home
Despite Sartre’s embrace of the liberating power of violence (influenced by
Frantz Fanon, a ground-level witness to the effects of the Algerian War), most of
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the French intellectual elite and French society-at-large was committed to the
construction of a peaceful, prosperous, and moral France devoid of imperial
entanglement, especially when these intrigues invited violence within the hexa-
gon and international scorn. In fact, a sizeable majority of metropolitan French
favored direct negotiations with the FLN (which would have most certainly
meant eventual independence) from 1957 onwards.23 The issue of torture became
a shibboleth separating the colon-minded factions of French society from their
post-modern counterparts. By resorting to torture, France (hijacked by the colons
and the military) “betrayed the nation’s historic reputation as the birthplace of the
Rights of Man,” while simultaneously confirming the FLN’s argument that
Algeria was never part of France but instead a colonial possession where the
freedoms and liberties of Continental France did not apply.24
Although the FLN terror campaign in France proper was brief, low-impact,
and lacking in commitment, it did serve to remind the Continental French that
their colonial cousins, through intransigence and brutality, had brought their con-
flict back to France — a place where neither most of these colons nor many of
their ancestors had ever been. This “blowback” came in two forms: the political
“Algerianization” of France25 and the spread of terror (both colonist and FLN) to
the hexagon. The “incontestable psychological shock” of terrorist attacks on the
police and economic targets, though modest, did cause “panic, insecurity, disar-
ray, disorientation, bouleversement, and fear” in French society,26 while the press
seizures, limits on free speech, violations of juridical norms, and increased police
brutality ate away at France’s view of itself as the exemplar of European civi-
lization.  
The Algerian War eventually produced an environment in which the met-
ropolitan French increasingly saw themselves as distanced from their African
brethren and those Frenchmen sent to protect them “whom the colons regarded
as the modern-day equivalents of French crusaders of a bygone era.”27 As the war
progressed, metropolitan France came to view the colons as violent, brutish
reminders of a past best left behind — a community unable and unwilling to
ascribe to the mores and values of post-modern Europe. The image of the pieds-
noirs was further tarnished by the enthusiastic support given them by the nostal-
gics for Vichy and their receptiveness to such quarter.28 According to John
Talbott, 16 percent of mainland France felt no solidarity at all with the settlers
and half of the population responded “somewhat” or “little” when questioned
about their solidarity with the pieds-noirs.29
Paris’ decision to allow the colons to form paramilitary self-defense units
(Unités Territoriales), the government’s wink-and-nod approach to the raton-
nades (‘rat-hunts’ i.e., colon vigilante and French army pogroms against
Muslims), which resulted in the deaths of over 5,000, and the increasing use of
torture by the paratroopers (or paras), which was nearly universally condemned
outside of France, began to tear the nation apart. As Saadi Yacef, the FLN’s mil-
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itary commander in Algiers, stated, “So torture is a problem that fell more on the
shocked French conscience than on the conscience of the Algerians, who were its
eternal victims.”30 The protection of the colonizing “other” through the use of
torture did not sit well with much of France’s intellectual community.  
Writing as a “simple citizen” in Le Monde, Henri Marrou believed that the
very essence of France was being undermined. This was occurring through
media censorship imposed by a government now invested with ‘special powers’
but especially by the systematic practice of torture, which Marrou contended
brought shame on the country of the French Revolution and the Dreyfus Affair.
Although official spokesmen were still falling over themselves to deny the use of
torture, Marrou [and other intellectuals] compared the French torturers to the
Gestapo, asserting that nobody in Algeria denied it was being used.31
The last straw was undoubtedly the use of terrorism by the Organisation
de l’armée secrète (OAS)32 on French soil — an organization that finally made
explicit the long-implied connections between the political leanings of the pieds-
noirs and the French fascists of Vichy.33 The manifestation of “white terror” in
support of imperialism was anathema to what Europe, and most of French soci-
ety, stood for by the early 1960s. It should also be remembered that pieds-noirs
terrorism actually “escalated” the conflict in Algeria itself; since it was not until
the secret pieds-noirs bombing of the Casbah (reprisals for a spate of violent
attacks on local administrators and police) that the FLN began a policy of indis-
criminate bombing attacks on settlers in Algiers. The most infamous of these
were coordinated attacks in September 1956 on the Milk Bar and Cafeteria, con-
ducted by female FLN operatives wearing European apparel and make-up to
avoid police detection — an act immortalized by its neo-realistic portrayal in
Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 movie, The Battle of Algiers. These attacks were,
according Saadi Yacef, a direct response to the nearly two dozen bombings
against Algerian Muslims including one in Rue des Thebes which demolished
three buildings and took some 70 lives.34 According to Yacef, 
You have to understand that at this time the ultracolonists, the pied
noirs, would often disguise themselves as paratroopers, and, because
they were not interested in any mercy, they would place bombs indis-
criminately, resulting in the death of civilians.  So we too began to
place our bombs indiscriminately, not really worrying about the con-
sequences.35
Ultra-colonist and FLN terrorism in Algeria and at home steadily led to a
disturbing reduction in civil liberties within the hexagon, including patently un-
French limitations on the rights of its resident Algerian guest worker population
and press seizures. As Harrison stated, freedom of information became “one of
the earliest casualties of the Algerian war.”36 In the country which gave birth to
the Declarations of the Rights of Man in 1789, Guy Mollet’s description of tra-
ditional liberties as “weakness” did not sit well with the general population.37
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Importantly, international media coverage of terrorism during the Algerian War
tended to focus much more on the actions of the ultra-colonists (ultras) and their
French army allies than on that perpetrated by the Muslims,38 possibly further-
ing the psychic disavowal of a society still coming to terms with the institution-
al violence of Vichy.  
Sentiment against the discriminatory police curfew and suspected police
collusion in anti-Algerian violence led to the demonstrations and ensuing deaths
of hundreds of protestors on 17 October 1961. The police response to the
Fédération de France du FLN-organized protest was exceptionally brutal.
According to Joshua Cole, “Numerous witnesses reported seeing police throw
the bodies of unconscious protesters over the parapets of the city’s bridges and
into the river Seine.”39 In his essay on Franco-British relations during the
Algerian War, Martin Thomas stated, “It was hard to imagine anything on the
British street remotely akin to the horrific killing of over 200 Algerian immi-
grants by the security forces in Paris.”40 The circumstances surrounding those
events (including the revelation that the préfet de police, Maurice Papon, who
masterminded the crackdown, had been involved in the deportation of Jews from
Bordeaux to concentration camps in the Second World War) further polarized
French society and sowed distrust between the political elites and intellectuals
with the masses caught somewhere in between.  
Exorcising and Internalizing the Imperial “Others”: Muslims, Pieds-Noirs,
and Harkis
As Gil Merom argued, “In the final analysis, the French had to decide
whether they wanted to preserve the democratic identity and order in France (and
the benefits associated with them) or keep Algeria French (and lose whatever
benefits democracy entailed).”41 The inherent institutional violence of imperial-
ism served to create a Jekyll-and-Hyde complex during the years of the Algerian
conflict. Metropolitan France embodied the rational, prosperous, and moral spir-
it of the post-modern era, while the ultra-vigilantes, para torturers, and the insid-
ious regeneration of the Polizeistaat were vestiges of modernity in all its nega-
tive and violent connotations.  Merom discussed a growing divide between the
French Algeria lobby, which advocated great brutality, and the French intellectu-
als, who saw the war as a cancer eating away at soul of the nation and enslaving
the political order.42 William Cohen recounted, “A public opinion poll revealed
that 57 percent of Frenchmen believed that between half and the total of the
Pieds-Noirs belonged to the OAS.”43 French society ultimately came to see the
pieds-noirs as an unacceptable appendage, one which darkly reflected its own
checkered past. France was happy to set about forgetting and erasing this
anachronistic and embarrassing vestige once de Gaulle brought an end to the
war.  The pieds-noirs, though allowed to immigrate to metropolitan France, were
effectively swept under the carpet, forced to live out their lives as marginalized
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non-entities fuming at the loss the of their Algeria in smoky men’s clubs — out
of sight and out of mind.44
Unlike the pieds-noirs, the harkis — French loyalists among the Muslim
community — tended to stick out like a sore thumb in post-1962 France. These
Algerian refugees came to represent a national stain on French ineptitude during
and after the war and a powerful, transnational reminder of the destructive and
lingering effects of political terror. According to Brillet:
Strictly speaking, the word ‘harkis’ originally denoted one of the cat-
egories of former Muslim auxiliaries in the French army who had
served on a voluntary basis under the French flag during the War of
Algerian Independence (1954-1962). When Algeria achieved inde-
pendence in 1962, those former auxiliaries . . . who were able to
escape the National Liberation Front’s bloody reprisals were forced
to seek exile in France.45
Although Paris was loath to admit these refugees, it was totally incapable of forc-
ing the FLN-dominated government of Algeria to adhere to the clauses of the
Evian Declaration which proscribed reprisals against anti-nationalist factions
within Muslim society.  The terms of the Declaration of Guarantees read:
No one may be harassed, sought after, persecuted, convicted or be
subject to penal sentence, disciplinary sanction or any discrimination
whatsoever, for acts committed in connection with political events
that occurred in Algeria before the day of the proclamation of the
cease-fire.
Instead, the FLN hunted down formerly pro-French Muslims and employed a
policy of summary execution and internment resulting in the deaths of upwards
of 150,000 people. Despite France’s desire to not offend the new Algerian lead-
ership, Paris ultimately admitted roughly 130,000 refugees from Algeria — a
population which in France became “living and embarrassing witnesses to the
violation of the ceasefire accords by the Algerians.”46 By contrast, in Algeria the
harkis represented an “internal enemy” par excellence and “scapegoat for all the
problems that affect independent Algeria today.”47
In many ways, the action taken by the FLN against the harkis after inde-
pendence was merely a continuation of well-established policy of political dom-
ination within Algeria. A vast majority of the deaths in Algeria during the strug-
gle for independence were the result of Muslim-on-Muslim violence. The FLN
had used terror to satisfy two primary goals: first, to rend all ties between the col-
onizers (the Europeans) and the colonized (the Algerian Muslims) and second, to
obliterate any rivals to its claim to be the seul interlocutor valuable.48 They were
eminently successful on both counts and subsequently emerged as an exemplar
for revolutionary terrorists around the world from the IRA to the Black Panthers.
Thus, the full ascension of the FLN to power in post-independence Algeria
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sounded the virtual death knell for European settlement and the actual death
knell for the harkis who remained in-country. Knowing full well the fate that
faced their former auxiliaries, many French military officers violated the agree-
ments on repatriation and were severely reprimanded by Louis Joxe, minster for
Algerian affairs, for their disobedience. De Gaulle, however, had little sympathy
for the harkis, who, after Algeria achieved its independence, he saw as “collab-
orators.”49 De Gaulle did not stand alone; the word harki has become synony-
mous with ‘traitor’ across the Muslim world.50 French society was little more
disposed to incorporating them — due in no small part to their role as painful
souvenir of a recent humiliation. Unlike the pieds-noirs, harkis were not auto-
matically granted citizenship but had to apply for it. Failure to achieve it could
result in deportation: a veritable death sentence.  Lack of skills and cultural dif-
ferences made their absorption into French society difficult, and the government
policies that kept them isolated in refugee housing for decades predictably led to
low levels of education and high levels of criminality among the second genera-
tion.  
It was not until the late 1980s that the government (under media scrutiny)
changed its policies toward the harkis and fully facilitated their integration into
French society, thus ending their long purgatory. According to Cohen, “Maybe
more than any other group of foreign origin, the Harkis presence represented a
test of the French ability to tolerate diversity and practice the principles of equal-
ity which their country had been identified since the great revolution of 1789.”51
According to most observers, France failed this test miserably. Thus, the harkis
— victims of one of the largest terror campaigns in the post-Second World War
era — fell victim to two tragedies: one associated with remembrance (as traitors
to the Algerian nation) and one steeped in forgetting (the policy of disregard
employed by the French government in whose name they fought). The treatment
of the harkis was part of a larger policy of “official amnesia” to which France
had grown accustomed after Vichy.  In the words of Richard Derderian, “The
French state pursued a willful forgetting as its primary strategy toward the
Algerian War, and one might add, much of its imperial past.”52
Caught up in this soul-crushing nexus, many second- and third-generation
harkis felt alienated and abandoned by both cultures. It is not surprising then that
many young beurs (as the Maghrebi community of France, using verlan slang,
call themselves) have turned to fundamental, universalist Islam in recent years to
provide meaning to the lives. Olivier Roy suggested that it was among those
young European Muslims who felt most disconnected and alienated from their
hereditary culture and the society in which they live who became “born again
Muslims,” i.e., turning to the constructivist community of the global ummah, and
in some cases, even to jihadism.53
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Realpolitik and the Postmodern Paradise: Reconciling de Gaulle’s
Relationship with Europe during and after Algeria
Although French involvement in European integration began with the
vision of Jean Monnet,54 it was not a national priority until the emergence of the
Fifth Republic under de Gaulle. De Gaulle’s unwavering distrust of Anglo-
Americanism and European supra-nationalism, combined with his realistic
appraisal of French foreign policy, perpetuated the development of European
integration on French terms. Before de Gaulle’s return to the French presidency,
European integration was based on partnership and resource sharing. Europe’s
earliest integrative institutions (European Coal and Steel Community and the
European Atomic Energy Community) were designed to foster equal develop-
ment and reconstruction within an established framework. De Gaulle criticized
these developments as antithetical to economic development and hindrances on
state power.
Upon his reascendancy in 1958, de Gaulle made it clear that France had to
return to its role as the “lynchpin” of Europe and resume its great-power status.
Realizing that France’s position in Algeria had deteriorated, de Gaulle made the
decision to exert pressure on the post-war alliance of the United States and Great
Britain for military support and to begin discussions on the creation of a “tri-par-
tite directorate” which would make Paris’ voice better heard in international rela-
tions.  In a meeting with the American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on
5 July 1958, de Gaulle suggested that “France must be a nuclear power . . . must
play a world role . . . participate in the directing councils of the alliance along-
side the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ . . . and must have its hegemony recognized in a com-
bined ‘Eurafrica’.”55 De Gaulle’s priorities were designed to stimulate French
public support and influence in political and military efforts.  
Unfortunately for de Gaulle, Washington had de-linked Algeria and the
spread of communism and had thus determined these priorities to be out of step
with the grander problem of creeping Soviet influence. As it became clear that
the United States would not aid the French in the development of nuclear arms
or include them in a tripartite global consortium, de Gaulle began his campaign
of French withdrawal from NATO. Although total withdrawal would not occur
until 1966, de Gaulle’s desire to remove French troops from NATO forces began
early in his second presidency. De Gaulle had used NATO as a way of rallying
nationalist sentiment in France. “The Fourth Republic’s inability to control its
army in Algeria was blamed on NATO’s integrated command”56 and not terror-
ism. For de Gaulle, NATO was a tool utilized by the Anglo-American clique to
increase their sphere of influence in continental Europe.  
By the end of 1958, de Gaulle had begun to realize that Britain was in a
precarious position. Although it still maintained its friendship with Washington,
Britain needed entrance into the Common Market established by the creation of
the European Economic Community (EEC). Britain’s Free Trade Association
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had floundered in comparison to its European counterpart, and Prime Minister
Macmillan had begun to realize that “Britain desperately needed French cooper-
ation”57 to join the EEC. While this development placed Britain in a difficult
spot, it increased de Gaulle’s power in Europe and leveraged his bargaining posi-
tion vis-à-vis NATO.
This increasing leverage led to talks with both Britain and the United
States regarding foreign policy and the role of NATO. When US  Secretary of
State Dulles arrived in Paris in December 1958, he was greeted with de Gaulle’s
plan of reorganization. De Gaulle made it quite clear that NATO must expand to
cover the Middle East and Africa, much to chagrin of the US. Curiously, consid-
ering his military background, he argued that it was in the best interest of the
United States and Britain to adopt a policy of inclusion, rather than warfare, in
order to maintain peace in North Africa and the Middle East. De Gaulle attempt-
ed to convince the Anglo-American alliance that Algerian success was inextrica-
bly bound to the communist threat. De Gaulle desired a “free” and “French”
Algeria; one that had rights and privileges under the new French constitution.
According to Irwin Wall:
France was undertaking an immense operation, politically and eco-
nomically, in the form of the Plan of Constantine, to transform
Algeria with its vast natural resources into a state that would be asso-
ciated with the West. If France abandoned Algeria, communism and
anarchy would result. Independence might come one day to Algeria,
but in cooperation with the West, not against it.58
Unfortunately for de Gaulle, both the United States and Great Britain dis-
regarded his pleas and ignored his rationale. Britain, whose commitment to the
EEC was based on the potential for lucrative European markets, had grown hes-
itant about compliance with “French demands that they accept a common agri-
cultural policy and a joint external tariff,” while the United States continued its
commitment to the protection of Europe and its exclusion of French leadership
in global affairs.59 As a result of these humbling negotiations, de Gaulle began
his vision for Europe and his new partnership with West Germany. Although he
had historically eschewed the concept of a Monnet-style United States of Europe,
de Gaulle’s sentiments began to shift in the early 1960s. The end of the Algerian
crisis, Britain’s demurring on economic policy, and the United States’ refusal to
back French security policy in the southern Mediterranean created a nexus that
prompted de Gaulle to began a new policy toward Europe — one in which the
integration of Europe would occur on his own terms. Slowly but surely, de
Gaulle emerged as the apotheosis of continental Europe.
Fearing the development and empowerment of such European-wide insti-
tutions that could potentially usurp the power of his beloved France, de Gaulle
began to endorse his vision of a Europe of States. Based on realist assumptions,
de Gaulle felt that l’Europe des patries was best suited to balance the tremendous
DooleySaunders  4/19/09  8:20 PM  Page 101
Winter 2007
102
military and political power of the United States in Europe and around the world.
“Even though every state would retain a veto on matters of vital national inter-
est, de Gaulle insisted, the institutions and spirit of the confederacy would nev-
ertheless exert a salutary pressure to harmonize those interests and arrive at joint
policies.”60 To de Gaulle, the creation of this confederacy would create a Europe
that would advance the interests of all states rather than diminish their individual
sovereignty.  De Gaulle described his vision for France and the integration of
Europe most eloquently in an address on 15 May 1962: 
I have never personally, in any of my statements spoken of a ‘Europe
of Nations,’ although it is always being claimed that I have done so.
It is not, of course, that I am repudiating my own; quite the contrary,
I am more attached to France than ever and I do not believe that
Europe can have any living reality if it does not include France and
her Frenchmen, Germany and its Germans, Italy and its Italians and
so forth. Dante, Goethe, Chateaubriand belonged to all Europe to the
very extent that they were respectively and eminently Italian,
German, and French. They would not have served Europe very well
if they had been stateless, or if they had written in some kind of
Esperanto or Volapuk. But it is true that the nation is a human and a
sentimental element, whereas Europe can be built on the basis of
active, authoritative, and responsible elements. What elements? The
states, of course; for, in this respect, it is only the states that are valid,
legitimate and capable of achievement. I have already said, and I
repeat, that at the present time there cannot be any other Europe than
a Europe of States, apart, of course, from myths, stories and
parades.61
For de Gaulle there was no other solution for Europe. If Europe continued to
grant supranational authority to European-wide institutions, France would never
regain its global preeminence and the United States would continue to dominate
the continent.
In 1961, as the Algerian War was ending, de Gaulle persuaded the mem-
bers of the EEC to meet in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the creation of a “union of
states” and an amendment to the Treaty of Rome.62 It was de Gaulle’s desire to
create European institutions that consisted of traditional heads of state, who
could act on behalf of their particular governments. De Gaulle believed that there
should be a “separate ‘European Political Commission,’ comprising officials of
the six foreign ministries who would reside in Paris and coordinate agendas for
meetings of foreign ministers and heads, leaving the EEC Commission in
Brussels with the ordinary economic agenda-setting role assigned it by the Treaty
of Rome.”63 Each member-state would have the ability of the veto in areas of
“extraordinary agenda items,” so as to not trample the sovereignty of each.  
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While the Bonn summit yielded limited results, it solidified de Gaulle’s
belief in a French-driven European community. For him the Bonn meeting high-
lighted the divergence of France from the other members of the EEC. It had
become apparent that the other members were content with the Anglo-American
protectorate and the possibility of further integration. In his desire to elevate the
status of France within the global community, and still smarting from
Washington’s intransigence on Algeria, de Gaulle refused to allow his European
brethren to create an American-influenced European system. Most would label
his diplomatic inability to convince the Americans, British, and other members
of the EEC as a failure. However, it is reasonable to assert that his stubbornness
and unwillingness to conform to the bipolarity of the Cold War is a major reason
for the current level of French success in European affairs.  
De Gaulle realized that Algeria had damaged his public support at home
and jeopardized France’s image abroad, and that “getting rid of it was perhaps
the greatest service he had rendered France in his career.”64 The “release” of
Algeria may have begun de Gaulle’s revival in French public opinion, but it was
his commitment to Anglo-American antagonism that truly won the hearts of his
citizens. Though many Americans viewed French policy with disdain, de Gaulle
realized that European success was dependent upon French participation, as well
as a certain level of independence on the part of Europeans themselves. De
Gaulle’s embrace of a leadership role in the European experiment led to his
strong relationship with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the isolation
of Great Britain, which he twice denied entrance into the EEC.  
Although French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 is often perceived as the
culmination of French frustration with America’s hesitation for a tripartite glob-
al directorate and coldly served revenge for its Algeria policies, it should also be
seen as the coup de grace in de Gaulle’s vision for Europe in a post-Cold War
world.  According to Wall:
Real self-determination for France in the postwar world required a
change in the status quo and a new international equilibrium beyond
Cold War politics. Once this was achieved, with France leading the
way, an end of the bipolar world based on mutual assured destruction
would become possible, and in time communism would be revealed
as a superficial veneer masking the deeper reality of the national tra-
ditions of the countries in which it ruled, allowing them to join the
West in a new world system of peace and equality. De Gaulle was a
prophet ahead of his time.65
It is difficult to argue that de Gaulle’s motives were not driven by a dogged
adherence to France’s national interest. It is obvious that they were. Yet, it is
plausible to suggest that his vision to recapture the past glories of France were in
line with his view of a united Europe. De Gaulle’s love of France was based upon
“continental” France; a France that was powerful enough to influence his
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European allies and stand up to the superpowers. In this respect, de Gaulle’s
France has never faded. It remains to this day, the seat of Anglo-American antag-
onism on the continent and the lynchpin of a united Europe. The Algerian crisis
precipitated a new milieu in Franco-European relations by distancing Paris from
both Washington and London at a crucial juncture. Without Algeria, de Gaulle
would have had to create a similar specter or would have had to tow the Anglo-
American line like the Benelux countries and West Germany. The immaculate
evacuation of Algeria when combined with simmering anti-Anglo-Saxonism
(some of which had been generated around the Algerian War) granted de Gaulle
the mandate and confidence he needed to chart a new “continental” course for his
beloved France, forever changing the face of Europe in the process.
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
A chance to look back at terrorism and the Algerian War at this point in his-
tory is not an unwelcome opportunity. The United States, once a vociferous crit-
ic of the methodologies employed by France to quell terrorist violence (torture,
ratonnades, a barricaded Algiers, press seizures, etc.), now finds itself embroiled
in a nightmarish simulacrum of 1950s Algeria. And it is now the French who lec-
ture the Americans on how to avert imperial quagmires and bloody blowback on
the home front. Abu Ghraib, raids on insurgent strongholds, the locked-down
Green Zone, and news management are all part of the daily headlines emanating
from the Middle East as the United States seeks to make Iraq “safe for democra-
cy” — a goal not that dissimilar from France’s intentions for Algeria after 1945.
Unfortunately, if one accepts this analogy as a predictive model for the future,
things look bleak indeed for the residents of Iraq. On the other hand, hope still
exists for the US to extricate itself from the imbroglio and benefit from doing so.
However, as every political scientist knows all too well, there are no predictive
models that have ever held up to scrutiny (although a few intrepid practitioners
continue to labor under the myth that the past provides a map for the future —
George W. Bush comes to mind).
But perhaps it is better to confine ourselves to a historical interpretation of
the events of Algerian War. Our contention is that FLN and OAS terrorism in
Algeria and the hexagon, when combined with creeping authoritarianism within
the Republic, shocked French society into rejecting imperialism. The alternative
to perpetuating colonial rule and suffering the deprivations that accompanied that
decision were not, of course, wholly unattractive. By committing to the European
experiment, France guaranteed its security within Europe, saw its material
wealth skyrocket, and gained great power status on the continent once again
(even if it was forced to forego superpower status — perhaps forever). Much of
this was an outcome of de Gaulle’s masterful statesmanship; however, we should
not discount the importance of Algeria in shaping the diplomatic, economic, and
military environment in which his realpolitik path was charted.
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While the above contention is liable to provoke debate and dissention
among historians (which we welcome), our second point is nearly beyond
reproach. The threat of political violence after the French quit Algeria directly
led to the migration of nearly 100,000 Arab and Berber Muslims from Algeria to
France (a number which grew through family reunification). France’s disgrace-
ful treatment of these refugees led to alienation and isolation for a community
that was already alienated and isolated due to its perceived treachery among the
Algerian population.  This double curse sat heavily on the shoulders of the next
generation, many of whom are now drawn to the radical teachings of the Jihadi-
Salafi Islamist clerics. Thus, the legacy of Algeria-related terrorism lingers in
twenty-first century Europe for both good and ill.
Kevin Dooley is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Monmouth
University.
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